Split Ponzi Explained
From FriendTech to Ethereum - Infinity Stones and the Steam Engine Moment
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| SPLIT PONZI |
+-----------------------------------------------------------+
| |
| Leverage --> Bubble --> Collapse |
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| Best way to reduce bubble: real output |
| Fastest way: open another ponzi |
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| Pool: YES | Free Exit: YES | Fixed Return: NO |
| Risk: HIGH | Analogy: Equity Investor |
+-----------------------------------------------------------+1/ Split Ponzi Definition
Under the condition of unchanged total system capital, multiplying the asset quantity corresponding to unit capital to attract subsequent capital entry.
"Multiplying" is where the term "split" comes from. The multiplied assets can refer to the same asset type or different asset types.
2/ The Demolished House Story
Using a worn-out pitch from ancient split schemes to explain:
| Stage | Property | Total Value |
|---|---|---|
| Initial | 1 unit at 500K | 1M (after appreciation) |
| Split 1 | 2 units at 500K each | 2M (after appreciation) |
| Split 2 | 4 units at 500K each | 4M (after appreciation) |
Asset quantity multiplies, total value keeps doubling
Ancient wisdom, do you see it clearly now?
3/ Liquidity Pool Perspective
Two hidden assumptions in this story:
| Assumption | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Need continuous new buyers for houses | Continuous new liquidity entering the pool |
| Your houses were never sold for cash | Continuously receive new airdrops without dumping on the pool |
Ancient split schemes (like MBI) would promise electronic shares only go up, because they centrally closed the channel for discounted cash-out.
4/ Implied Beta
In fact, cashing out requires liquidity. AMM curves tell us every price has corresponding liquidity, but when prices are inaccurate, liquidity can be terrifyingly low - your chips simply can't be sold.
Regardless of promises, the market will psychologically price your current situation. This pricing is often derived by comparing with other projects, called Implied Beta
5/ Collapse Models
Assumptions:
- Government splits 1 unit into 2 units each time
- Prices double every N splits
- Pre-split total property value X
- New immigrant buying pressure K
Formula: New purchases = Post-split total price - Post-split unsold total valueFour Collapse Points:
| # | Condition | Plain Language |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Existing owners don't sell, but K still less than formula right side | New buying can't come in |
| 2 | K unchanged, existing owners mass sell making right side exceed left | Existing mass selling |
| 3 | K unchanged, split count N too large | Splitting too fast, bleeding out |
| 4 | Constant 2 decreases, price can't double before next split | Price can't rise after split |
6/ Case Study: North India Property Crisis
Let's apply this to the property crisis in the Asian country of North India:
| Factor | Phenomenon |
|---|---|
| New buying can't come in | Birth rate plummeting, severe aging, urbanization over 60% |
| Splitting too fast | Massive new housing from infrastructure and monetized shantytown renovation |
| Existing mass selling | Trust crisis in major city governance due to pandemic policies |
| Price can't rise | Market confidence shattered by economic policies |
Therefore North India property prices broadly decline, even death spiral
7/ North India Authority Policy Options
Since property as collateral comprises too high a proportion of the financial system, price decline would trigger LUNA-style cascading liquidation:
| Policy | Effect |
|---|---|
| Increase urbanization rate | Increase rigid demand buying |
| Stop new construction approvals | Slow down splitting |
| Administrative measures to reduce secondary circulation | Prevent existing mass selling |
| Public opinion guidance | Change price expectations |
8/ Crypto Split Scheme: FriendTech
FriendTech rules:
- Users connect Twitter accounts to mint keys and own their room
- Keys priced via AMM curve
- No lockup period
- Holding earns points
Applying the model:
| Factor | FT Situation |
|---|---|
| Split speed | = Speed of influential new KOLs joining |
| Matthew effect | Very obvious, only crypto KOLs across languages have asset properties |
| Split ceiling | = Total count of these KOLs, higher saturation means geometrically declining split speed |
9/ FriendTech Collapse Analysis
New buying/Price expectations:
- Theoretical ceiling = Total Twitter users in crypto
- But KOL onboarding speed is fast, price discovery is fast
- Declining split speed reduces new user entry enthusiasm (top too expensive, no more unboarded big influencers)
Existing selling:
- Small scheme, high tax → Users have strong low-buy-high-sell tendency
- Only deterrent: Points airdrop weekly based on holdings, Paradigm backing
- But with Post changing policies, this insurance is nearly void
Final blow:
Inscriptions rise, crypto pumps, Beta surges. FT unable to split further and create profit effect completely dies out
10/ Case Study: BNB and Binance
$BNB was initially just a fundraising tool. So-called fee burning before '19 was just burning future unlocked shares, no real meaning.
Rights Evolution:
- '19: Launchpad/Launchpool began showing holding benefits
- '20: After BSC, became gas and base trading pair
11/ BNB Split Scheme Analysis
| Factor | Analysis |
|---|---|
| Split speed | BNB is special, splitting isn't uniform. Pancakeswap etc. DEX mint countless coins daily, but daily volume less than 5% of Binance core. CEX splitting mainly from Launchpad/pool frequency |
| New buying/Price expectations | Mainly from BNB rigid demand, i.e., relationship between BSC and Launchpad/pool return expectations and Beta |
| Existing selling | From split scheme perspective, main deterrent is Launchpad/pool comprehensive returns (average ROI × launch frequency) and BSC launch return rate |
A split scheme's greatest enemy is another higher-return, more explosive split scheme
12/ Ethereum: Split Scheme's Steam Engine Moment
Smart contracts + gas opened unlimited splitting industry imagination
Ethereum's base: Mining rig dividend scheme (still is after POS)
Inflationary output before ICO could only become sell pressure. ICO's emergence opened Ethereum's split scheme era.
13/ Ethereum vs Binance Split Logic
Binance splitting:
└── Concentrate entire platform attention/liquidity on new scheme = System-level bleeding
Ethereum splitting:
└── Project teams invest operations to buy attention (like airdrops) = Acquire system liquidity
└── Split speed = Annual new high TVL/liquidity project count14/ Ethereum Era Analysis
| Era | New Buying/Price Expectations | Existing Selling Problem |
|---|---|---|
| ICO | Mainly from explosive pumps on listing | Very severe, ICO project teams dump after fundraising, '18 dropped below $100 |
| DeFi | After Uniswap, ICO threshold even lower, pre-liquidity cost also lower, easy moon shots in low liquidity | Solved with '20 on-chain app development (involves three-scheme combination) |
15/ Vitalik's Legitimacy Narrative
From split scheme perspective, ICO era's chaotic splitting gave Vitalik huge trauma. So he established splitting rules through narrative and Ethereum inner circle white gloves:
DeFi narrative ──► NFT/SBT non-financial apps ──► LSD ──► Layer2 ──► Restaking
Each narrative's core positions are very limited = Control split rateReflexivity Problem:
- to-V entrepreneurship becomes mainstream
- Project philosophy increasingly homogeneous
- Legitimacy = High valuation
- Wild approaches/low liquidity no more
- Falls into insufficient split rate
- Beta crushed by BTC, Solana
16/ Split Scheme: Infinity Stones
Split schemes are Ponzi's infinity stones, crown jewels, because split schemes are cross-disciplinary engineering, the scheme type with fewest closed-system assumptions
You need to ensure three equilibria:
Split Scheme Three Equilibria:
| # | Left Side | Relation | Right Side |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Entry capital | ⟷ Dynamic equilibrium | Split rate |
| 2 | Split return rate | → Must | Suppress Beta |
| 3 | Existing sell pressure | ⟷ Equilibrium | Entry capital |
Core Formulas
Operator profit = Project team's total selling profits
Collapse conditions:
├── New buying < Split demand
├── Existing mass selling
├── Splitting too fast, bleeding out
└── Price can't rise after split
Split scheme three equilibria:
├── Entry capital ⟷ Split rate
├── Split return rate > Beta
└── Existing sell pressure ⟷ Entry capitalEverything is a scheme. A good project in Crypto must first be a good scheme.
Next: Composability Explained